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Background: Influencing the general public response to pandemics is a public health priority. There is a prevailing
view, however, that the general public is resistant to communications on pandemic influenza and that behavioural
responses to the 2009/10 H1N1 pandemic were not sufficient. Using qualitative methods, this paper investigates
how members of the general public respond to pandemic influenza and the hygiene, social isolation and other
measures proposed by public health. Going beyond the commonly deployed notion that the general public is
resistant to public health communications, this paper examines how health individualism, gender and real world
constraints enable and limit individual action.
Methods: In-depth interviews (n = 57) and focus groups (ten focus groups; 59 individuals) were conducted with
community samples in Melbourne, Sydney and Glasgow. Participants were selected according to maximum variation
sampling using purposive criteria, including: 1) pregnancy in 2009/2010; 2) chronic illness; 3) aged 70 years and over; 4)
no disclosed health problems. Verbatim transcripts were subjected to inductive, thematic analysis.
Results: Respondents did not express resistance to public health communications, but gave insight into how
they interpreted and implemented guidance. An individualistic approach to pandemic risk predominated. The
uptake of hygiene, social isolation and vaccine strategies was constrained by seeing oneself ‘at risk’ but not ‘a risk’
to others. Gender norms shape how members of the general public enact hygiene and social isolation. Other
challenges pertained to over-reliance on perceived remoteness from risk, expectation of recovery from infection
and practical constraints on the uptake of vaccination.
Conclusions: Overall, respondents were engaged with public health advice regarding pandemic influenza,
indicating that the idea of public resistance has limited explanatory power. Public communications are
endorsed, but challenges persist. Individualistic approaches to pandemic risk inhibit acting for the benefit of
others and may deepen divisions in the community according to health status. Public communications on
pandemics are mediated by gender norms that may overburden women and limit the action of men. Social
research on the public response to pandemics needs to focus on the social structures and real world settings
and relationships that shape the action of individuals.Background
The re-emergence of infectious diseases is a leading
public health problem. Pandemics and epidemics [1] –
including Avian influenza, SARS, Ebola, and pandemic
influenza – and the rise of anti-microbial organisms [2]
now threaten the health of populations around the
globe. It has been argued that the re-emergence of these
diseases marks the end of the golden age of medicine
and the dawning of a period where health and security* Correspondence: mark.davis@monash.edu
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Pandemic influenza stands out in this situation because:
it spreads quickly around the globe affecting many
millions of people; it is associated with, potentially, high
mortality, and; the world experienced a highly publi-
cised, though ultimately mild for most, pandemic
influenza in 2009/10. It is believed that another, more
serious influenza pandemic is inevitable, though no-one,
as yet, can predict when it will occur.
For these reasons, explaining infectious diseases
threats to the general public and encouraging them to
adapt their health behaviours is high on the publichis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
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communications feature in preparedness and response
planning which requires that members of the general
public adopt measures during a public health emer-
gency, including: hygiene (e.g., covering the mouth and
nose when sneezing or coughing, washing hands,
keeping surfaces clean, avoiding sharing personal items)
and the avoidance of close contact with others [4].
Understanding how populations respond is also crucial
for the science that supports response planning. For ex-
ample, mathematical models, which underpin pandemic
response planning, factor in biological, psychological
and sociological assumptions of how populations
respond to infectious diseases [5,6]. Effective communi-
cations with the general public and understanding how
they respond, therefore, have a pivotal role to play in
the management of pandemic influenza, in particular,
and in the area of emerging infectious diseases, in
general.
However, knowledge of how to best communicate on
pandemics with the general public and how they take
up these messages is an emerging field with some in-
consistencies [7]. Evaluations of the public health
response to the 2009/10 pandemic influenza claim that
public communications were largely successful in pre-
paring and reassuring publics during the emergency
[8,9]. These findings need to be read against the fact
that the pandemic was a short-lived and ultimately mild
public health emergency for most people.
There is a view, also, that members of the general
public are resistant to pandemic risk messages. Some
commentary has suggested that the general population
is increasingly resistant to public policy on global
threats, including climate change and emerging infec-
tious diseases [10]. Surveys – which dominate the social
scientific view on public responses – conducted during
the 2009 pandemic indicate that populations in the UK
and Australia were complacent with regard to H1N1
and reported insufficient behavioural responses [11-15].
Broad brush, risk communication research has identified
that material circumstances and symbolic framing of risk
[7], inequalities in education and access to media [16],
(mis)trust in media and governmental advice [17,18], all
shape how members of the general public respond to
communications on pandemics. Close-focus, qualitative
research offers the view that while the general public
endorses governmental advice, in the circumstances of
the 2009/10 pandemic they were also unlikely to act in
the ways advised by governments [19,20].
There are additional explanations for the apparent
resistance on the part of the general public. For example,
because they are bombarded with so many messages, in-
cluding those pertaining to pandemics, members of the
general public may by subject to ‘health threat fatigue’[21]. This is not the same as resistance. It is, instead, a
dulling of alertness seated in screening out of over-
whelming and competing risk messages. Members of the
general public appear to digest and critically reflect on
risk communications messages [22], and tailor risk
reduction strategies to their personal circumstances [23].
It is also argued that the general public is only too aware
of the ‘boy who cried wolf ’ syndrome [24], where too
frequent assertion of danger leads publics to dismiss
public health warnings. In addition, audience reception
of communications on health is framed by the historic
rise of individualism in society [25] and health systems
[26]. Individualism implies that members of the general
public take on the view that responsibility for their
health is a matter of personal volition and effort. This
view is often utilised in health communications that call
on people to take care of themselves, but it is a
perspective that can obscure factors that are not within
the control of the individual. It is also an approach to
risk that has a moral loading and therefore a negative
effect for those who are unable – through choice or
otherwise – to avoid health harms. Exactly how indi-
vidualism plays out in relation to pandemic influenza
warrants further inquiry.
Because it is so vital that public health authorities
communicate with members of the general public as
effectively as possible and as there are competing expla-
nations and routes of inquiry available in the literature,
it is necessary to re-examine the apparent resistance to
communications and advice on the part of the general
public. A central challenge is to get beyond prevailing
assumptions and build up a theory of public engagement
informed by the life worlds of the general public [7].
Understanding why populations fail to sufficiently enact
precautions must involve taking account of how lives are
lived and the meanings ascribed to the threat of infec-
tious diseases. Indeed, what might look like lack of
precaution may turn out to be reasonable given the ma-
terial and symbolic circumstances of affected individuals
and populations. A related challenge, then, is re-examining
how public health characterises the general public in
research on pandemics and in the more general area of
emerging infectious diseases. Taking these steps is vital to
ensure that the public health response and its communica-
tions with the general public are as resonant, meaningful
and effective as possible.
This paper, therefore, uses inductive, qualitative
research methods to develop new knowledge on how
members of the general population respond to pandemic
influenza, set against the backdrop of the assumed
resistance on the part of the general public and related
critiques, including, health risk fatigue, the risk commu-
nication dilemma and individualism. The analysis poses
the question:
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threat of pandemic influenza and to the hygiene, social
isolation and other measures proposed by public health?
By addressing this question in the manner indicated,
the paper offers an alternative framing of pandemic
influenza perceptions and behaviours in an effort to con-
tribute to the better health of individuals and popula-
tions facing risk of infectious diseases.Methods
The following analysis was generated in international
research (Australian Research Council Discovery Project
DP1101081) focusing on the responses of members of
the general public to the events of 2009 alongside inter-
views with researchers, clinicians and policy-makers
[27,28] and analyses of the public policy texts on pan-
demic influenza control [29]. This research has examined
general public data in light of sociological and psycho-
logical perspectives on responses to pandemic influenza
[23,30-33]. The present paper synthesises and builds on
the research undertaken on the general public, in
particular, and introduces new data analysis to address
the public health challenge of effective communication
and engagement with members of the general public.
Interview and focus group participants were recruited
through community sampling in Melbourne, Sydney and
Glasgow. Generating data in Australia and Scotland
addressed the international dimension of pandemic
influenza and the events of 2009. Australia was closely
observed by other nations as early stages of the global
pandemic in 2009 coincided with the southern hemisphere
influenza season. The pandemic quickly affected
Melbourne, which reported a high and early peak of
known infections [34,35]. The city, for a time was
known as the ‘flu capital of the world.’ The first
confirmed cases in the UK were in Scotland among
passengers on a flight from Mexico to Glasgow [36].
The UK and Australia reported 457 [8] and 191 [37]
deaths, respectively, associated with the 2009 H1N1
pandemic. Our analysis of interview and focus group
texts reveals more convergence than difference
between Melbourne, Sydney and Glasgow, perhaps
because the pandemic was managed in those cities
by public health professionals who were members of
a global pandemic response network.Table 1 Sample by purposive selection criteria and city




Total 15 10The research aimed to identify how members of the
general public respond to pandemic influenza so that
public health communications can be designed to
engage with how its audiences respond to risk messages
and how they enact hygiene, social isolation and related
measures. Four purposive criteria were used to select
respondents in each city: women who were pregnant
during 2009 (or with a new baby); older members of the
community (71 years of age and older); people with
compromised immune systems and or respiratory illness
such as asthma; and people who self-identified as being
‘healthy’ (e.g., no disclosed health problems) and who
did not belong to one of the former categories. In
addition, selection of participants was conducted to
ensure: a balance of male and female participants and a
range of ages from 18 years upwards. Drawing on inter-
views and focus groups ensured depth and breadth.
Interviews explored in-depth discussion of personal ex-
periences of living through the H1N1 pandemic,
seasonal influenza and related concerns. Focus groups
examined social norms concerning precautionary
behaviours regarding pandemic influenza.
Between April 2011 and May 2012, 116 people
participated in the research (see Table 1) in 57 inter-
views and ten focus groups (with 59 participants).
Interviews included people from the purposive criteria
(pregnant = 14; 71+ = 3; HIV/respiratory illness = 17;
healthy = 23); a gender mix (women = 34; men = 23),
and; an age range of 18 to 71+ years. Focus groups
included people from the 71+ group (10); HIV/respira-
tory illness (37) and the healthy group (22); a gender
mix (women = 36; men = 23), and; an age range of 18
to 71+ years. This pattern of participation reflects the
challenges of recruiting women who were pregnant in
2009, the very elderly and men. Seven respondents
reported having been diagnosed with H1N1; none
through a laboratory-confirmed test (a reflection of
our community sampling). A further eleven inter-
viewees reported that a relative, friend or other social
contact had been diagnosed, clinically. It needs to be
acknowledged, however, that, as influenza is not
ordinarily diagnosed with a laboratory confirmed test
[38], public health professionals and members of the
general public identify and manage the infection on
the basis of symptoms. Indeed, respondents noted
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symptoms. Taken together, these figures demonstrate
that a diverse sample was recruited which enabled
data collection from members of the general public
variously impacted by the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. The
methods were approved by the Monash University
Ethics Committee and participants provided written
informed consent.
Participants were asked to speak about their experiences
with influenza and the public health response to the 2009
pandemic. Topics for discussion included: health back-
ground (including pre-existing medical conditions, other
infectious diseases, influenza vaccination); influenza
experiences (including knowledge of pandemic influ-
enza, sources of knowledge, experiences with the 2009
pandemic and seasonal influenza, prevention of infec-
tion, caring for self and/or someone else with infection);
public communications (including broadcast and elec-
tronic media, public health advice, advice from GPs,
workplace and schools). Verbatim transcripts of inter-
views and focus groups were analysed using an
inductive, theory-building method. All transcripts were
open coded to generate themes for analysis. Interpretive
memoranda were generated which explained each
theme and how it connected with existing perspectives
on the general public response to pandemic influenza.
The research team reviewed these themes and memo-
randa to ensure that the themes were understood and
that they could withstand refutation. This discussion
also provided the basis for an agreed coding scheme
that was used to re-code all data. Key themes were iden-
tified for subsequent, in-depth written analysis in the
form of technical reports and draft manuscripts. Our
approach to coding, memo writing and in-depth
analysis sustains a dialogue between theory (pre-existing
categories derived from social science theory and the
relevant literature) and data (inductively-derived
themes). This approach avoids the traps of overly data-
or theory-driven analysis and ensures that the research
has relevance to the field. This paper, therefore, is based
on in-depth, nuanced analysis of interview and focus
group texts that offers new perspectives and proposi-
tions, which provide the basis for interrogating prevail-
ing assumptions regarding the general public response
to pandemic influenza. This approach is consistent with
social inquiry of the highest standard [39].
Results
The assumed complacency and resistance on the part
of members of the general public was not in evidence
in the narratives provided by our research participants.
Other factors, centred around health individualism
and contextual factors such as gender and biomedical
situation do appear to influence how people respondto the threat of pandemic influenza. In what follows,
we focus on themes that establish and complicate the
role of health individualism and its effects in the
responses of members of the general public to pan-
demic influenza.
Self and other in responses to pandemic influenza
The interviews and focus groups revealed a tension to
do with self and other in relation to the threat of pan-
demic influenza. As we have discussed elsewhere,
respondents endorsed the pandemic control measures
advocated by public health authorities [23]. They agreed
that hygiene control measures (coughing and sneezing
etiquette) and social distancing were valuable. This en-
dorsement held in Australia and Scotland. Characteris-
tically, however, respondents did not believe that
pandemic influenza could be prevented in the long run.
They believed that the influenza virus was easy to catch
and that hygiene measures and social isolation were
difficult given that social interaction was needed to sus-
tain work, schooling, the family and daily life. For this
reason, respondents focused on strengthening their im-
munity through, for example, taking vitamins and eating
healthy food:
I think if you’re healthy, keep up your vitamins and
eat the right foods, drink healthily, eat healthily and
live healthily. Exercise. You’ve got to do all those
things. (Heather, 71+, Melbourne)
This immunity boosting was seen as a prudent defence
against the seemingly inevitable moment of exposure
and a means of coping with infection when and if it
occurred. Importantly, this focus on one’s body and im-
munity in the face of seemingly inevitable infection
accentuated health individualism, encouraging members
of the general public to focus on their body’s abilities to
resist and cope with infection. There was evidence that
immune boosting has the status of a social norm as
those who were seen to succumb to infection were
sometimes judged as failing to adequately care for them-
selves, even though it was admitted that the virus was
easy to catch. To some extent individualism is an asset
for public health interventions that seek behaviour
change at the individual level. However, an individualistic
approach to pandemic risk may obscure factors that the
individual cannot control and, as indicated by the
judgement of those who acquired infection, health indi-
vidualism may be moralising.
Health individualism was not the only factor influen-
cing how members of the general public perceived risk
for pandemic influenza and took action. Respondents
who had responsibilities for others (e.g., pregnant
women, people in couples or caring for people with
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themselves as vulnerable to influenza (e.g., respiratory
illness, immune disorders) focused on social units such
as the couple, family and colleagues at work:
Well given that the flu broke out at XXXX Street
Primary School and my son was three and he was at
XXXX Street Childcare, I pulled him out. So when my
husband picked him up that day I was at work. I said,
‘Take him home. Give him a bath. Wash his clothes.’
Yeah. I stopped sending him and I was one week off
my maternity leave so I stopped work a week early …
I didn’t go to the supermarket, didn’t really mix. (Gill,
pregnant, Melbourne, 31 – 40 years)
It appears, then, that both health individualism and
relationships with important others influence what
people do. In this regard, social proximity appears to be
important, that is, those others who are close to oneself
in terms of social and emotional ties and living situation
are factored into health precautions. This social proximity
also showed up in the ways in which respondents saw
geographical distance and low population density as pro-
tective. Those respondents living further away from the
populous ‘epicentres’ of infection – central Melbourne, for
example – believed that they were less likely to encounter
someone with the virus.
‘We’re familiar with chest infections’
One important way in which this tension between
responsibility to oneself and to others came to light in
interviews and focus groups related to differences
between the responses of those with pre-existing condi-
tions and those who identified as ‘healthy.’ Those who
faced increased risk of serious disease focused on their
relationships with others – including strangers they
might encounter in public spaces – largely in an effort
to protect themselves. Those with no vulnerabilities
showed themselves to be archetypally focused on their
individual health. For example, people with severe
respiratory illness reported that engagement with the
risks of influenza was a ‘well trodden path’ for them:
As lung patients, we’re, we’re familiar with chest
infections and, as Joy says, we could, we could have a
flu and not know it. And the GP checks us over. And
the only way that I know that they’ll know whether it’s
a chest infection or flu, or pneumonia, is for an x-ray.
(Arthur, Lung disease, Melbourne, 71+ years)
People with pre-existing lung conditions, then, were
commonly hyper-vigilant during the 2009 pandemic and
their accounts were peppered with examples of how
social interaction was imbued with risk for them andalso some resentment that the healthy majority seemed
to not understand the significant threat that influenza
infection might pose to their health [33]. People with
immune disorders in our sample – primarily HIV –
understood they needed to be vigilant but saw influenza
as a lower priority than their HIV infection and its
effective management. Older respondents (71+) con-
veyed judicious vigilance tempered with an unwillingness
to be seen to overreact. Important in these accounts was
awareness of the vectors of transmission and that one’s
health was to some extent dependent on those with
whom one interacted. In contrast, the healthy majority
of our respondents saw pandemic influenza as a per-
sonal, though distant, health threat. They saw themselves
‘at risk’ and possibly as ‘a risk’ to close family, but not as
‘a risk’ to unknown others (e.g. a person sitting beside
them on public transport). This focus on the ‘at risk’ self
to the exclusion of the self as ‘a risk’ to others underlines
how health individualism manifests in the responses of
the ‘healthy’ majority of the general public.
‘Just ignore it and push through’
This focus of the healthy on their own health risks (at
the expense of others) surfaced in narrative on expecta-
tions of recovery from influenza:
Like you sort of just, you think, maybe you just think
influenza as a common cold sort of thing. And it’s
like, ‘It’ll pass. I might go to the doctor’s and get some,
something to help me get through it,’ or something.
But yeah, I don’t know … It’s just like, ‘Just ignore it
and push through.’ (Chris, healthy, Melbourne, 18 –
30 years)
This interview participant shows how a healthy individ-
ual engages with pandemic influenza as a commonplace
and personal risk, in contrast to those with pre-existing
conditions who have to take pandemic, and even
seasonal, influenza seriously. This expectation that one
can ‘push through’ reinforces the previous theme noted
with regard to the focus on the capacity of one’s body to
deal with infection. It is also an orientation to influenza
risk that sets the scene for individuals to determine that
infection is a risk worth taking since recovery is likely.
Also, recovery expectations synergise with the belief that
infection is difficult to avoid in the long run. This means
that people may assume that, while non-pharmaceutical
strategies of pandemic control are sensible, their limited
utility is set against the likelihood of recovery. This nexus
of risk calculation helps explain why segments of popula-
tions appear to be complacent in surveys, as noted above.
They may in fact be making multi-layered risk assess-
ments of the likelihood of infection, their health status
and expectations of recovery.
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Another important provision on health individualism
was the gendered meanings of one’s response to infec-
tion. Particularly in domestic settings, the management
of respiratory illness was largely feminised. Women pro-
vided elaborate accounts of managing the respiratory in-
fections of family members while men did not.
Importantly, the pejorative term ‘man flu’ was used to
denote the over-inflation of mild symptoms to gain sym-
pathy and respite from normal activities, with connota-
tions of questionable masculinity:
It’s always a little difficult to tell when you’re moving
from, sort of, a cold through the man flu to proper
influenza. (Vincent, healthy, Sydney, 41 – 50 years)
These findings imply that responses to pandemic
influenza in real world settings are – as with other
health problems – associated with gender roles which
shape behaviour, for example, women may be expected
to perform infection control and symptom manage-
ment, while men are expected to not show their symp-
toms and ‘soldier on’ or face accusations of ‘man flu.’
The uniform implementation of social distancing and
other protective measures may therefore be compromised.
‘Everything is about the baby’
Accentuating the role of gender in response to messages
concerning pandemic influenza, pregnant women found
themselves thrust into a position of particular risk
during the 2009/10 pandemic, at a time when they were
already taking responsibility for the well-being of their
unborn child. In particular, the prospect of vaccination
elicited varied, often emotion-laden, responses:
Well, (sigh) when you’re pregnant everything is about
the baby … You just want to try and make your baby
as healthy as possible and you want to try and keep
your baby safe. (Rebecca, pregnant in 2009, Glasgow,
31 – 40 years)
The imperatives of good motherhood and responsibility
for their unborn children placed these women into the
emotionally-charged position of having to make decisions
regarding virus protection in circumstances of intense
uncertainty [32]. Some distress was apparent among the
pregnant women respondents, but also great resilience
and active use of public policy information to protect
themselves and their babies.
Vaccination: ‘That’s a bit of a Catch-22’
As Rebecca’s account, above, indicates, health individualism
in tension with responsibilities to others, gender and one’s
life situation played out in engagements with vaccination.Though recollection was variable, 64 respondents in
the present research (55%) reported that they had had
an influenza vaccination at some point in their lifetime
and there was no evidence of ‘in principle’ resistance to
vaccination. This is a notable finding given that partici-
pants were sought in community settings – where those
with anti-vaccine views are thought to be located – and
in light of commentary that members of the general
public are resistant to the science and technology used
to manage global threats. Indeed, endorsement of pub-
lic health measures and attempted compliance charac-
terised the respondents’ accounts, with the provisos on
the practical value of non-pharmaceutical strategies of
infection control and management, as already discussed.
But, taking on vaccination was not always straightforward:
I saw in the press releases about the vaccine and I
remember ringing the clinic and they said,‘Well if we
were to give it to you, you’d have to come to the
hospital and that’s gonna put you at risk of getting
exposed to it so we’d rather you not come in for the, for
the vaccine.’And I was thinking, ‘Well that’s a bit of a
catch-22.’ (Cindy, Lung disease, Sydney, 18 – 30 years)
For someone with a specific vulnerability, then, accessing
vaccination presented a problem of relative risks – in this
case, of reducing the threat of infection through vaccination
combined with the risk of exposure in a clinical setting –
underscoring the importance of one’s life circumstances in
the management of the threat of influenza. Respondents
also noted that the good reputation of vaccination waxed
and waned, in this case, in the context of the 2009/2010
pandemic:
One minute everybody’s going, ‘I wanna vaccination,’
and the next minute everyone’s too paranoid. (Jan,
Lung disease/pregnant in 2009, Melbourne, 31–40
years)
Importantly, though, vaccination, like non-pharmaceutical
infection control, wasmostly discussed as a personal strategy
of health protection. Apart from those with pre-existing
vulnerabilities, vaccination was not readily understood as a
method for protecting others and therefore society. This
individualistic focus on one’s own health implies that efforts
to promote ‘herd immunity’ may not accord with percep-
tions and behaviours of the healthy majority.
Discussion
The findings question the prevailing view that the
general public resists risk communication with regard
to pandemic influenza. Nor do the related ideas of
complacency and fatigue seem relevant. More salient
was multi-layered risk management informed by health
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sonal responsibilities, one’s personal circumstances,
gender, expectations of recovery, and prior experiences
with influenza. As others using qualitative methods
have also suggested [19], respondents did not reject
what was done by governments in 2009. They show
interest in pandemic influenza, though their mode of
engagement with it varied. They indicated that they
wished to be informed but reserved the right to inter-
pret and apply advice according to their own situation.
Public health guidance on hygiene and social isolation
was endorsed, though its utility was largely found to
have practical, long-term limitations given that social
interaction was fundamental to daily life and the trans-
mission of the virus.
Resistance and the related notions of complacency and
fatigue, then, appear to have limited value for explaining
how members of the general public respond to pan-
demics. Part of the reason for this inapt attribution of
research results to public resistance concerns research
approach. Forced choice surveys produce measures of
hypothesised variables thought to influence behaviour.
In-depth interviews and focus groups yield a different
picture, where general public perceptions of the dangers
of pandemics are placed in the context of what appears
to be endorsement of the efforts of public health, tem-
pered with awareness of the practical difficulties of
managing influenza on a local basis. Personal experience
narratives reveal members of the general public to be
engaged and willing to apply guidance in real world
settings, though also aware of limits on what might be
possible in time of pandemic.
Going beyond the idea of resistance, our analysis
offers an alternative framing of how members of the
general public respond to pandemic influenza. Health
individualism complicated by life circumstances (family
life, health status) and the gendering of the meanings
and practices surrounding the experience of influenza
and how to deal with it in real world settings, appear to
be important. Risk communications are likely to benefit
by addressing these influences on risk management be-
haviours. In particular, emphasising individual responsi-
bility in risk communication may amplify divisions
between people with different biomedical vulnerabilities
and encourage those who consider themselves healthy
to think of themselves as ‘at risk’ but not ‘a risk’ to
others. This is a major hurdle for public health, particu-
larly when hygiene, social isolation and vaccination are
likely to become more important methods for control-
ling the spread of re-emerging infectious diseases. The
pejorative, gendered meanings of influenza, of which
‘man flu’ stands as exemplary, point towards the deeply
inscribed gendering of responses to infectious diseases.
The role of gender in social aspects of health care is nosurprise, but fully-fledged gender analysis is yet to be
acknowledged in the public health address to the gen-
eral population with regard to pandemics. In particular,
messages to enact hygiene and social isolation are likely
to accentuate already feminised health care in the do-
mestic sphere. Further, it is not simply that women are
burdened with the labour of influenza care and men
not. If men do find themselves unwell they risk accusa-
tions of ‘man flu’ and may therefore avoid making
themselves available for health care interventions, a dy-
namic which keeps men out of the GP clinic in general
[40]. As recent reviews have indicated [7,16], the influ-
ences of social factors on responses to pandemics need
to be foregrounded in the social research agenda for
better public health. Our research indicates that health
individualism and gender need to be part of this new
research agenda.
Our findings also point to several further, specific,
challenges for risk communication: ideas of proximity
to risk; expectations of recovery, and; vaccination.
Proximity appears to be a blind spot in risk communi-
cations. Public health messages of emergency are
filtered by perceptions of proximity to threat, consistent
with psychological theory [41] and cultural constructs
where the source of contagion is placed at a distance
from self [42]. We found that these ideas of proximity
did surface in the narratives of members of the general
public. Yet, we know that, for example, within six
weeks of the infection being detected in Australia,
people in remote communities in Australia were found
to be infected [43]. Risk communication needs to
attend to these ideas of distance from risk and the
related underestimation of the speed with which the
influenza virus can travel in a hyper-connected world.
Expectations of recovery from influenza also appear to
dominate narratives. As others have argued [44], healthy
respondents recognised influenza infection as severe –
requiring bed and rest – but thought that they would
eventually recover. This finding implies that members of
the general public may interpret infection as a risk worth
taking, that is, that they can cope with infection if
prevention fails them, due to their own choices or other-
wise. Members of the general public appear to be
actively engaged with manifold risks that they juggle and
prioritise in real world settings.
Our findings also suggest that taking up vaccination is
not a simple matter, even among those who endorse the
use of the biotechnology. Survey findings have found
that approximately 42% of Australians are concerned
about general vaccine safety [14] and that Australian [45]
and worldwide [46] rates of H1N1 vaccination have been
found to be insufficient, prompting concerns that the
‘anti-vaccine lobby’ and other detractors are influencing
use of this biotechnology. As noted, a slight majority of
Davis et al. BMC Public Health  (2015) 15:436 Page 8 of 9our respondents reported that they had been vaccinated
in their lifetime and none spoke of vaccination as
dangerous, though, of course, some may have held
these views and not revealed them or opted out of our
community-based recruitment strategies. Our research,
however, points to more immediate and practical con-
siderations that shape how and when people vaccinate,
including considerations of relative risk and whether or
not a new vaccine should be used in pregnancy.
Attending to these more immediate concerns may be
beneficial for public health, though we acknowledge
that public perception of vaccine technologies is also
an important public health agenda.
The analysis presented is retrospective as the inter-
views and focus groups were conducted after the end of
the pandemic on 10 August 2010 [47], and therefore
when it was known that the mortality rate had at first
been overestimated [48]. Importantly, too, the respon-
dents were volunteers selected according to purposive
criteria, implying that the sample is not representative
and that generalisations to populations are not strictly
tenable. What the analysis offers, however, is the oppor-
tunity to drill down into how people make sense of
pandemic influenza, therefore providing the basis for
building theory on how members of the general public,
think, feel and act in the contemporary era of efforts to
manage global health threats. The perspectives identified
here help situate what we know in social context and
alert public policy to some dilemmas and alternative
explanations of why members of the general public do
what they do.
Conclusions
For public health to shape the actions people take prior
to and during a pandemic, we need to understand and
engage with the perspectives of those acting. Viewed
from the outside, the behaviour of the general public has
been cast as resistant. However, viewed from the
perspective of ordinary people involved in anticipating
and responding to infection, it is clear that public health
has engaged its publics. This engagement is frequently
informed by individualistic ways of assessing and
responding to risk, social norms (e.g. gender roles),
knowledge of the clinical uncertainties of influenza
infection, and reasoned thinking about the limits of pre-
venting influenza transmission. The current challenge
for pandemic influenza preparedness and response is not
so much to address public disinterest, but to acknow-
ledge and engage with members of the general publics’
experiences of influenza and how they make sense of,
and act on, pandemics in real world settings.
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